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A NOTE ON VOETHOGENIC HARM: THE POLITICS OF
SCIENCE AND THE PROFESSIONS
by
Warren C. Haggstrom
UCLA School of Social Welfare
Abstract: "voethogenic": helper-engendered.
If one wants to check out how good a new dog is in herding
cattle, one has to find some cattle, send the dog after them, and
observe what happens. That works because what the dog does and
its outcome are so striking as to rule out all but one rough
interpretation concerning what has given rise to what.
It is different with the helping of people.
If a physician prescribes a medication for several patients
and they all get better, the getting better may have little or
nothing to do with the medication since most illnesses get better
(or worse) over time regardless of the medication. In other
words, there is an alternative explanation to that of the effec-
tiveness of the medication: the interpretation that the disease
is self-limiting. The most certain way to tell whether the
medication was effective would be if there were two identical
groups of sick people only one of which received the medication.
If, after a period of time, it were to turn out that the members
of the group receiving the medication were more nearly free of the
illness than members of the other groups, the physician could then
reasonably conclude that the medication was effective.
The situation becomes even more dificult when one evaluates
the talk-therapies (counseling, psychoanalysis, dynamic psychia-
try, the work of clinical psychologists, caseworkers, marriage
counselors, etc.). The problem of evaluating a medication con-
tinues since many psychological problems also get better or worse
over time regardless of therapy. Thus, when the therapist feels
that she or he has been helpful, there is another reasonable
interpretation: that the person in therapy would have been just
as well off without having had it. The talk-therapist, therefore,
almost always needs the experimental-control-random-assignment-
group approach in order to determine his or her effectiveness.
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However, evaluation of the talk-therapies encounters a further
obstacle that is uncommon among physicians. The obstacle is that
it is very difficult to estimate which of the identical groups is
better or worse off after a period of being helped.*
For one thing, anxiety may have declined in the group being
helped--but a realistic analysis of the situations of those helped
may reveal that they should have remained as anxious as they ini-
tially were. A person in great danger is not helped by becoming
complacent. Further, the problems of group members being helped
may simply have been displaced by different problems. If a
therapist helps clients to become less anxious and the anxiety is
succeeded by depression, it is difficult to know whether the help-
ing has left those helped better off or worse off. Finally,
judgements concerning the problems of people who go to talk
therapists are notoriously of doubtful validity.
Consider, for example, the study reported by Robert J. Stoller
and Robert H. Geertsma ("The Consistency of Psychiatrists' Clini-
cal Judgements," The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, Vol.
137, #1, July, 1963, pp. 58-66.)
This study had 27 psychiatrists watch a half hour film of a
third year medical student talking with a patient. They were all
psychiatric faculty in the UCLA School of Medicine and were trying
to create a criterion for use in examinations within the School.
The film was such that they could see the patient from the per-
spective of the interviewer.
In rating 565 statements concerning the patient on a scale of
0 to 5, their inter-rater agreement (correlation coefficient) was
only 0.37. The authors summed up the results as follows:
*However, physicians are not completely without difficulties in
this area. See e.g., Phillip L. Rossman, "Organic Diseases
Simulating Functional Disorder," in GP (Published by the American
Academy of General Practice), Vol. 28, #2, August, 1963, pp. 78-
83. Dr. Rossman, (of Los Angeles), reported on 115 patients who
had symptoms common to both organic and psychiatric illnesses and
who were referred for psychiatric treatment although it later
turned out that their diseases were organic.
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"psychiatrist-experts were unable to agree as to a
patient's diagnosis, prognosis, psychodynamics, causes
of her problem, the feeling she was consciously ex-
periencing, or the feelings that were latent (uncon-
scious)." (P. 64)
A number of other studies have produced results consistent
with this outcome.
For example, someone interested may examine Chapman, L. and
Chapman, J., "The Genesis of Popular but Erroneous Psychodiagnos-
tic Observations," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1967, 72, 193-
204. Perhaps the classical discussion of how this comes about was
published in 1949 by Gustav Icheiser ("Misunderstanding in Human
Relations: A Study in False Social Perception", The Journal of
Sociology, Vol. LV, #2, September, 1949; Part 2,pp. 1-70.) See,
especially, page 25 and 46-47. A more recent summary of research
concerning this criterion problem can be found in Michael J. Lam-
bert, et. al., "Therapist-Induced Deterioration in Psychotherapy,"
pp. 452-481 in Alan S. Gurman and Andrew M. Razun, Effective Psy-
chotherapy, N.Y.: Pergamon, 1977. In a section entitled "The
Criterion Problem," the authors generalize as follows:
"Except for disorders of organic etiology and the dis-
tinction between psychosis and neurosis, the standard
diagnostic classifications have provided low reliabili-
ty." (P. 475)
If clinicians cannot agree on all these things, then a great pro-
portion of their judgements must be invalid. How, then, can we
use the judgement of clinicians or of clinically related research-
ers as to the status of those having been subjected to helping
efforts by talk-therapists? This problem has rendered doubtful
the interpretations of most outcomes of the hundreds of effective-
ness studies of talk-therapies.
What, then, is left? Is there an outcome criterion which is
valid? There remains, most convincingly, the criterion of rela-
tive mortality. If the helping helps people to live longer, then
we can conclude (at least for most people, but not counting such
exceptions as George Orwell and George Bernard Shaw) that the help
has been effective.
It is for that reason that I have selected in evaluating talk
therapies only and all random assignment-experimental-control
studies in which the outcome criterion is mortality. Because very
little competent medical research concerning effectiveness falls
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outside mortality studies, except in such areas as the introduc-
tion of drugs, I have also used mortality as a criterion in
evaluating medical practice. There are very few such studies.
The following are representative of those few.
First Effectiveness Studies
Beginning in October, 1966, and ending in October, 1969, a
group of English physicians conducted a random-assignment-
experimental-control-experimentation of the outcomes of homes as
compared with hospital intensive care treatment for a group of men
under 70 years of age who experienced acute myocardial infarction
(heart attacks). See H. G. Mather, et al., "Acute Myocardial In-
farction: Home and Hosital Treatment," British Medical Journal,
August 7, 1971, pp. 334-338).
During those three years, 343 cases were allocated at random
either to (a) home care with a family, or (b) hospital treatment
initially in an intensive care unit. The patients given hospital
treatment were usually assigned to intensive care units for a
minimum of 48 hours and otherwise cared for in the adjacent medi-
cal ward.
Of 169 patients randomly assigned to hospital care, 12 (7.1%)
died within seven days. Of 174 patients randomly assigned to home
care, 5 (2.9%) died within seven days. During the time between
eight and twenty-eight days after treatment began there were no
differences between the two groups in number of deaths.
These figures probably substantially underestimate the ad-
vantage of home care since an unknown number of patients who
transferred during the experiment from home to hospital care were
counted as having received home care when the data were analyzed.
Such a category decision presumably related to an assumption by
the researchers that patients were transferred from home to hospi-
tal care because they had become disproportionately ill at home.
I have discovered only one empirical analysis which sheds
light on whether that plausible assumption is, in fact, correct.
In a similar experimental-control-group-random-assignment study
comparing (a) only medical treatment with (b) coronary bypass sur-
gery, Murphy, et al. found no survival advantage to the surgery.
(See Marvin L. Murphy, et al., "Treatment of Chronic Stable Angi-
na", New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 297, #12, September 23,
1977, pp. 621-627.) In the Murphy, et al. study, as in the
Mather, et al., one, there were cross-overs from medical treatment
to the experimental one and initial assumption of the exceptional
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illness of those who crossed-over. The authors, however, when
they examined the cross-overs, were unable to discover that they
differed from those who remained in the medical treatment group.
(P 625) If that were also to hold for the Mather, et al., study,
those who crossed-over to hospital care should not have been clas-
sified in data anlaysis as belonging to the home care category.
(The cross-over group resembled the hospital group, not the home
care group, in mortality rate.) If we take that Mather, et al.,
mistake into account, it becomes clear that, in the Mather, et
al., study, a patient randomly assigned to hospital care was sub-
stantially more than twice as likely to die within one week than
would have been the case had he stayed at home.*
The Mather, et al., studyt gave rise to a vigorous discussion
among English physicians of the relative merits of home versus
hospital care. That study had been attacked as unethical at its
inception and was not generally accepted by "the medical communi-
ty" after being published. The most common criticism was that
only a little over 28 percent of the population of the study was
randomized. In the remaining cases, it was not possible for both
physician and patient to agree to the randomized treatment.
A follow-up report was published by Mather, et al., in 1976.
(Mather, H.G., et al., "Myocardial Infarction: A-Comparison
between Home and Hospital Care for Patients" British Medical Jour-
nal, 1976, 1, 925-929). This paper added that after 300 days 20
percent of those receiving home treatment and 27% of those receiv-
ing hospital treatment had died.
In order to get further data, David Hill and associates
received a Department of Health and Social Security support grant
to make a randomized study of home and hospital care. This effort
began in 1973. The outcome was published in Lancet in 1978 (Hill,
J.D., et al., "A Randomized trial of home-versus-hospital
*In 1971, Reuel A. Stallones reported that he and Robert Buechley
"in analyzing mortality statistics from the states of the United
States, found a strong positive correlation between the physician-
population ratio and coronary disease." (Environment. Ecology,
and Epidemiology, Pan American Health Organization Scientific
Publication, No. 231, p. 9). Of course, no correlation demon-
strates causation, but it may eventually turn out that part of
such a relationship results from the greater prevalence of hospi-
tal care where physicians are concentrated.
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management for patients with suspected myocardial infarctions",
Lancet, I, 837). In this study, 76 percent of the patients were
randomized into the study, thus warding off in it the most common
criticism of the Mather, et al., study.
Hill and his colleagues reported that, after six weeks, the
morality from home care was 20%, that from hospital care, 18%. (I
have not yet re-analyzed these data and do not know what the out-
come of such a re-analysis would be.)
There have been no other home-versus-hospital studies done
relating mortality to myocardial infarction which meet my
criteria.
One indication of the orientation of the medical profession in
England was the recommendation in 1975 that the number of coronary
care units in hospitals be rapidly increased. (See Report of
Joint Committee of British Cardiological Society and Royal College
of Physicians, "The Care of the Patient with Coronary Heart Dis-
ease," Journal of the Royal College of Physicians, 1975, 10, 5).
The nature of the controversy in England may be reflected in
the fact that many of the older physicians tended to prefer home
care. Young physicians tended not to, perhaps because of possible
recriminations if patients died unexpectedly. (See Aubrey Coll-
ing, Coronary Care in the Community, London: Croom Helm, 1977, p.
173).
Although the outcomes of these studies were available to
physicians throughout the world, they appear to have had no other
impact on publication, practice, or research, In the Soviet
Union, organization to ensure early hospitalization was the ideal
and, in the single recent book which has been translated into En-
glish, there are no references to home care or to the Mather, et
al., and Hill, et al., studies in spite of a huge bibliography.
(ee E. I. Chazov, Ed., Myocardial Infarction: The Approach to
Prevention, Diagnosis and Treatment in the Soviet Union, Little-
ton, Mass.: PSG, 1979).
The situation was similar in North America. For example, in a
standard text, Emanual Goldberger wrote, "All patients with an
acute myocardial infarction or suspected myocardial infarction
should be admitted to a coronary care unit (CCU)." (Treatment of
Cardiac Emergencies, St. Louis: C.W. Mosby, 1977, 2nd Edition)
There is also no mention of home care in the many other similar
recent books which I have consulted. A recent bibliography on
home care supported by the United States Department of Health,
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Education and Welfare (The Franklin Research Center: Home Health
Care Programs: A Selected Bibliography. Hyattsville, MD, U.S.
Department of HEW, 1979) contains no references to heart attacks
or myocardial infarctions--or to the English evaluation studies.
However, a group sponsored by the World Health Organization (A
Working Group for the World Health Organization: Coronary Care
Outside Big Centers, Copenhagen, Regional Office for Europe,
1975), has a short section entitled "Care of the patient at home"
(p. 8) which considers the possible utility of home care, espe-
cially for people distant from hospitals.
One could anticipate the reactions to the Mather-Hill studies
by extrapolating from current practice. In England, where there
is substantial home care, the outcomes reported are nonjudgemen-
tal. Mather, et al., did not make note of differences within the
first week after the attack, but drew conclusions based on a later
time when the differences were less striking. Where there is no
legitimated practice of home care (as in the Soviet Union and the
United States) the evaluation research has been mostly ignored.
The criticisms by cardiologists of the Mather-Hill studies
tend to be ignorant of the nature and uses of evaluative research.
Some go further to mis-report data.
That these failures of solid research to be utilized are not
unprecedented can be illustrated by reference to a famous occur-
rence from the history of medicine.
Second Effectiveness Study
In the mid-Nineteenth Century, the lying-in department of the
General Hospital in Vienna was one of the greatest of its kind in
Europe. It had been divided into two separate clinics in 1833.
When women in labor came in to deliver their babies, if they came
at one time of the week they were assigned to the first clinic, at
another time they went to the second clinic. Thus, unintentional-
ly, women were randomly assigned to one or another of the two
clinics.
Beginning in 1840, the first clinic was made available for the
instruction of medical students only; the second clinic was avail-
able to midwife students only. Thus, different treatments had
been assigned for each of the two roughly identical groups of
women.
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With this arrangement, the mortality rate of the first clinic
suddenly rose to more than double that of the second clinic and
remained far higher in subsequent years. Women became aware of
this difference and many sought, unsuccessfully, to be admitted,
against the rules, to the second clinic.
The deaths were from puerperal fever (childbed fever), a dis-
ease which, in 1846, resulted in the deaths of 11.44% of the women
in the first clinic, but only 2.7% of the women in the second
clinic.
Ignac Semmelweis*, a physician and surgeon who was in charge
of the first clinic, realized that the difference in mortality
rates had something to do with the differences between the clinics
and tried to figure out what was the cause.
Semmelweis noted that the doctors, some assistants, and some
medical students in the first clinic dissected the cadavers of
women who had died and then examined the patients who remained
alive. This sequence of events did not occur in the second
clinic. He concluded in 1847 that the difference between the two
clinics in mortality rates was caused by those who first dissected
cadavers and then conducted manual examinations of the women in
labor.
Semmelweis, therefore, put into effect a rule that all who
examined women would first thoroughly clean their hands in a chlo-
rine wash. The death rate in the first clinic promptly dropped to
approximately that in the second. Through analysis of statistical
trends, clinical and anatomical, and even animal, studies, Semmel-
weis provided adequate evidence for his causal hypothesis and for
the effectiveness of his treatment.
He thereby had become the first person to demonstrate the ef-
ficacy of antisepsis in medicine, a discovery which governs surgi-
cal practice to this day.
*Semmelweis had taken his medical training in what was then the
leading medical school in the world, in Vienna. Among many
sources, the reader can consult Frank Slaughter's Immortal Maqyar:
Semmelweis, Conqueror of Childbed Fever, New York: Schuman, 150;
or Gy. Gartvay and I. Zoltan, Semmelweis: His Life and Work,
Budapest: Akademicial Kiado, 1968.
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However, his work was either ignored or attacked. By 1859,
more than a decade after his discovery had been demonstrated, his
reports were largely forgotten or had excited very little interest
in Europe and the United States, all places in which childbed
fever was frequently epidemic. He could not even get his writings
published in most of the important medical journals of his time.
With few exceptions, all the great obstetrical authorities had
rejected his ideas. When he pubished his major opus on the sub-
ject in October, 1861, the resulting reviews were mostly hostile.
About three decades after Semmelweis's discovery, Pasteur an-
nounced the identity of the bacteria which caused puerperal fever.
Only following that announcement, with Sermnelweis dead and his
work mostly unknown, dismissed, and distorted, did his method of
averting childbed fever gradually win general acceptance. (He had
also used antisepsis in surgery before its "discovery" by Lister.)
Semmelweis had suffered greatly from the rejection of his
brilliant, tenacious, ingenious, and crucially important research.
He died in 1865, mad.
These illustrations of the reception of effectiveness research
are not generalizable only within the profession of medicine. Our
next illustration is from a different helping profession.
Third Effectiveness Study
With the cooperation of thirteen selected social and health
agencies, 164 older people in need of protective services were
randomly assigned to receive, or not to receive, casework assis-
tance during the year June, 1964, through May, 1965, at the Benja-
min Rose Institute in Cleveland. The project director for this
effectiveness study was Dr. Margaret Blenkner, professor and di-
rector of the Regional Institute of Social Welfare Research, the
Uiversity of Georgia School of Social Work. Dr. Blenkner was na-
tionally recognized in this area of research, having published
eighteen studies prior to the final report on this one.
Four caseworkers provided help to those in the experimental
group. Their average caseload was about 19 clients each. "All
held master's degrees in social work and one had an additional
third year of graduate social work training: all had more than
fifteen years of experience." (See Blenkner, M.; Bloom, M. and
Nielsen, M., "A Research and Demonstration Project of Protective
Service", Social Casework, Vol. 52, Oct., 1971, pp. 483-499.
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The research team followed up the clients in the two groups
year by year for four years after their original registration in
the project. They accumulated data on comparative survival.
At the end of the first year, they found that, in the ex-
perimental group, 19 out of 76 clients had died (25%). In the
control group, 16 out of 88 had died (18%). Thus, those who
received intensive casework help were much more likely to have
died than those who did not receive such help. Analysis of the
data demonstrated that caseworkers had tended to institutionalize
their clients and that the difference in institutionalization ac-
counted for the entire difference.
By the end of the fourth year, however, the picture had
changed significantly. By then, 48 out of 76 in the experimental
group had died (63%) and 46 of 88 in the control group (52%). In
other words, the clients in the experimental group had continued
to die at a greater rate than had the clients who had received no
special intensive help. However, the difference at the end of the
fourth year was maintained entirely by noninstitutionalized
clients. Institutionalization made no difference at the end of
that length of time. (The differences in absolute numbers reflect
the fact that 43 clients had crossed over into institutions during
the final three years of the analysis.) (For these and other
data, see Margaret Blenkner, Martin Bloom, Margaret Nielson, and
Ruth Weber, Final Report: Protective Services for Older People,
Cleveland: The Benjamin Rose Institute, 1974.)
Although there had been several previous studies relating help
to mortality in casework and allied professions, all consistent
with it in outcome, the Blenkner, et al., study was followed by no
further such research. There was no subsequent publicized discus-
sion except for that aroused by later publications by Joel Fi-
scher, and I have no evidence that this and previous similar
studies affected casework practice.*
*1 anticipate that Margaret Blenkner, who died in 1973, will be-
come the greatest heroine of social workers since Jane Addams.
There are no candidate heroes of social workers.
Discussion
The outcomes of these three studies reflect the limited
population of effectiveness research in the helping professions
which meets my criteria. No study demonstrated that helping in-
creases life span, although a few allowed for the possibility that
life span was unaffected.
The lack of utilization of the research was also typical. the
studies have tended to be ignored and distorted.
A striking illustration of the latter can be found in
Katherine M. Wood's comforting report, "Casework Effectiveness: a
new look at the research evidence" (Social Work, Vol. 23, #6,
November, 1978, pp. 437-458). Wood entirely ignored the Blenkner,
et al., analysis of noninstitutionalized clients, although it had
been prominently published in two places and reported in publica-
tions by Joel Fischer, all sources of which Wood was cognizant.
Fischer is the only person to have published a fair (although-
superficial) account of the Blenkner et al., research. Typically,
Fischer's account led to an acrimonious, but unenlightened, set of
reactions from social workers. Wood's distorted discussion in
Social Work was followed by a single published letter applauding
her "definitive" article and maintaining that "we have since moved
past the question of whether or not direct social work is effec-
tive. The new and urgent question is how we can make this prac-
tice more effective." And, "It is a wonderful thing to be a so-
cial worker in this age..." (Social Work, September, 1979, p.
441.)
Given the reception of these studies, we may inquire next
whether these effectiveness studies are significant enough to war-
rant attention. Let us consider them one by one.
The figures, of course, are small, and may not be widely
generalizable. However, the significance results from the pos-
sibility that they are.
If we extrapolate from the Mather, et al., study to the United
States, a change to home care, using the most conservative set of
assumptions, would save more than eleven thousand lives annually
during the first seven days following a heart attack. The saving
in cost would be enormous.
There are no data which can lead us to estimate the number of
lives which could have been saved had Semmelweis found a different
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reception to his work. But the number of women dying during
childbed fever epidemics sometimes reached 100 percent--and this
in major hospitals throughout the western world.
The Blenkner, et a]., study, generalized, would lead us to the
conclusion that, of every 31 clients, five would be unnecessarily
dead at the end of four years. That is, each worker with such a
caseload would have killed, on an average, at least one client a
year. Not even the average Sicilian Mafia member manages to af-
fect mortality that much. If there were protective service work-
ers adequate for the population in need of it (using Blenkner's
estimate), the resulting loss of life through casework would ex-
ceed 40,000 a year. Of course, we do not know the population to
which the Blenkner, et al., research can be extrapolated. Con-
ceivably it could be the entire population of casework clients--
there is no evidence to the contrary.
Assuming that these studies and the responses to them are rep-
resentative and that they are significant, is it possible that
they have not been given attention because they are simpy inex-
plicable and to be regarded as anomalous phenomena unworthy of
further attention?
Certainly the history of the Semmelweis discovery demonstrates
its explicability and the value of taking it seriously, even
though Semmelweis, himself, had been unable to demonstrate the
underlying mechanisms of infection. Let us, therefore, next con-
sider Mather, et al., and Blenkner, et al.
There has been substantial research supporting the conclusion
that relocation of ill elderly people increases their mortality
soon after relocation. (See, e.g., I. Wittels and J. Bilwinick,
"Survival in Relocation," Journal ofGerontoloqy, 29, 440-443,
1974). This research, contrary to the Blenkner, et al. opinion
(but consistent with their data) demonstrate that it is not being
in institutions, but becoming institutionalized, which results in
higher mortality rates. Further, the patients taken to hospitals
in the Mather, et al., study, were both ill and being relocated,
and it was the older patients who disproportionately died in
hospitals compared to homes.
Second, the studies are similar in that heart attack was the
only cause of death in the one and allegedly the main cause of
death (according to death certificates) in the other.*
Further, deaths in the Blenkner, et al., study occurred
primarily in hospitals (47%) or other institutions (38%) in which
iatrogenic illness is a considerable possibility. Let me briefly
elaborate.
In 1981, Steel, et al., published the latest in a long series
of studies of iatrogenic illness which have been conducted in many
places by many research groups. (See "latrogenic Illness on a
General Medical Service at a University Hospital," New England
Journal of Medicine, March 12, 1981, 304: 638-642.) In this
study, 36 percent of 815 consecutive hospital patients on a
general medical service were conservatively estimated to have an
iatrogenic (hospital-acquired) illness. In two percent of the 815
patients, the iatrogenic illness was believed to contribute to the
death of the patient. That great an incidence of iatrogenic-
related death would wipe out about half of the mortality dif-
ference in the Mather, et al., study (although one should regard
such comparisons with caution.) However, it would account for
less of the difference observed in the Blenkner, et al., study
even if caseworker intervention made it more likely that clients
would go to such places (as seems evident from the data).
Further, it is likely that the Steel, et al., study underre-
ported iatrogenic deaths since it apparently did not take into
account the possibility of psychogenic deaths. For example,
Jarvinen ("Can Ward Rounds Be a Danger to Patients with Myocardial
Infarction?", British Medical Journal, February 5, 1955, pp. 318-
320) reported five people who died during ward rounds in a short
time at a Helsinki University Hospital and an additional patient
who died shortly after an attack which began during ward rounds.
If deaths had occurred at an expected rate, given the time spent
*One must, however, regard such death certificate figures as very
uncertain in view of diagnostic problems. For example, Marizama,
Danber and Kennel (in National Cancer Institute Monographs, 19:
405, 1966) looked at 1,362 death certificates coded as cardiovas-
cular. They found that in only 12% of cases was the diagnosis
"well-established," in an additional 40% was the diagnosis "rea-
sonable," and in 48% of the cases the diagnosis was "probably in-
correct" or "better replaced by another diagnosis." The debate
continues in the medical journals.
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on ward rounds, only one, or at most two, deaths would have oc-
curred then. ("Two deaths occurred when the patients were told
that the time for their discharge, so eagerly awaited, had come.")
A recent study indicates that even nonaffective speech, very
likely disproportionately to occur in the experimental groups of
the Mather-Blenkner-et al., studies, might increase the possibili-
ty of death from heart attacks.
James J. Lynch, et al., ("The Effects of Talking on the Blood
Pressure of Hypertensive Individuals," Psychomatic Medicine,
Vol.43, #1, February, 1981, pp. 24-33) studied the blood pressure
of 30 hypertensive and 15 normotensive people before, during, and
after they talked for two minutes in response to the suggestion,
"tell me about your work." All subjects showed increased blood
pressure while talking. "The patients with the higher pressure
tended to have the greater increase in blood pressure during talk-
ing." One patient went "from a pressure of 157/86 while sitting
quiet up to 200/120 while speaking and immediately down to 174/88
in the first resting quiet minute after talking."
It is certainly likely that more intensive help is accompanied
by more talk.
Possible explanations could be multiplied. For example, it
may be that, in the two studies, experimental treatment resulted
in an imposition of standards and norms on those being helped
which were alien and degrading to them, more so than in Instances
of less intensive help.
But one mystery remains. How is it possible that the
Blenkner, et al., clients began to succumb so greatly in the ex-
perimental group years after the experiment was over? Is that not
inconceivable? Not at all. We can suppose that various subse-
quent helpers became aware of whether those helped had or had not
been in the experimental group and differentially treated them
(possibly with more intensively mobilized help for those who had
been members of the experimental group) on that basis.
Although these are only possible explanations for the outcomes
of the effectiveness studies, they do illustrate the fact that the
study outcomes cannot be considered worth rejection or being ig-
nored as beyond comprehension.
If the studies are representative, significant and comprehen-
sible, how then can we explain the contrast between the studies
and their utilization?
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What May be Going On
A long time period between a discovery or invention and its
adoption is not unknown. The cotton picker was invented in 1889,
yet it was fifty-nine years before it became an innovation in
1948, long after the death of the inventor and during a time of
labor shortage. (Keith Norris and John Vaizey, The Economics of
Research and Technology, London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1973, p.
77). In the field of geology, the continental drift theory was
proposed more than fifty years ago and generally accepted just
recently. (See Seymour H. Mauskopf, Ed., The Reception of Uncon-
ventional Science, Washington, D.C.: 1979.) In this instance,
acceptance awaited an adequate explanation for the phenomenon (as
was also the case with Semmelweis).
The literature does not account in any detail for variations
in acceptance, although numerous cases of resistance to discovery
have been published. (Anthony M. Graziano, "Clinical Innovation
and the Mental Health Power Structure: A Social Case History,"
American Psychologist, Vol. 24, #1, January, 1969, pp. 10-18;
Genevieve Miller, The Adoption of Innoculation for Smallpox in
England and France, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1957; Bernard Barber, "Resistance to Scientific Discovery,"
Science, Vol. 134, No. 3479, September, 1961, pp. 596-602; A.J.
Dessler, "Swedish Iconoclast Recognized After Many Years of Rejec-
tion and Obscurity," Science, Vol. 170, #3958, 6 November, 1970,
pp. 604-606); Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scien-
tific Fact, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; Thomas S.
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd Edition, Chica-
go, University of Chicago Press, 1970; Levine, Why Innovation
Fails, Albany, New York: State University of New York Press,
1980; and innumerable accounts of the resistance to technological
innovation in traditional societies.)
My impression, based on examining the huge relevant litera-
ture, is that its main thrust concerning our question can be indi-
cated by observations of three famous people and one who continues
not to be well known:
1. Walter Bagehot: "One of the greatest pains to human
nature is the pain of a new idea."
2. Niccolo Machiavelli: "The innovator makes enemies of
all those who prospered unde the old order, and only
lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would
prosper under the new."
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3. Oliver Heaviside (when his important contributions to
mathematical physics had been ignored for 25 years):
"Even men who are not Cambridge mathematicians deserve
justice."
4. T.H. Huxley: "Authorities, 'disciples,' and 'schools'
are the curse of science and do more to interfere with
the work of the scientific spirit than all its enemies."
To generalize, a discovery is more likely to be accepted if it
does not violate basic assumptions and/or interests of those
who become acquainted with it, if they perceive there to be an
advantage for them from accepting or adopting it, and if it is
explainable to those who become acquainted with it.
The effectiveness studies in the population meeting my
criteria can be regarded, therefore, as discoveries which are un-
likely quickly to be utilized in spite of their relevance to the
life spans of millions of people and to annual expenditures of
hundreds of billions of dollars.
Can anything be done about this paradox?
Some Things Which Might Be Considered for Eventual Trial
I make two recommendations as follows:
I. One might be able to affect the perceptions, and thereby
eventually the practices, of helpers.
It is characteristic that helpers and those who make help-
ing policy are seldom informed by the perception of other
groups relevant to the helping.
Consider Semmelweis. When he discovered that the death
rate in the first clinic was several times that in the
second, he need not have looked for the cause of childbed
fever. He could instead, have tried to have the hospital
closed down (since he knew that women giving birth in the
gutters were safer than were women giving birth in his
clinic.) He could have changed the hospital so that the
two clinics were the same--most easily by beginning also to
teach only midwives in the first clinic. This change would
immediately have resolved the problem. He could have de-
ployed midwives and midwife students throughout the neigh-
borhoods, taking into his clinic only women with complica-
tions so grave that their chance of living would be greater
in his clinic than outside it.
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He apparently conceived of none of these solutions although
we can suppose that the women patients wanted some such
alternative and that midwives would have been receptive to
it. Truly, every way of seeing is also a way of not
seeing! And professions and disciplines provide ways of
seeing.*
If, today, we wish not to inform the public of the implica-
tions of presently known and possible future effectiveness
research concerning the helping professions, an alternative
which may yet become necessary, then we might begin by provid-
ing that "outside" perspectives become vividly and intermina-
bly available to those who are important in the formation of
helping policy and related research, education, and funding.
For example, it may be possible to ensure that representatives
of organizations of consumers of health and other helping ser-
vices be included in the decision-making processes of the
helping professions. Others who should be "counted in" in-
clude chairpersons of legislative committees which are central
to funding helping enterprises and key members of their
staffs, directors of relevant foundations, leading epidemiolo-
gists, public health professionals, public health nurses,
sociologists of the helping professions, philosophers of
science, historians of organized helping, and so forth.
My second and final recommendation is so complex that I will
only sketch it here, leaving a systematic presentation for some
future time. It is as follows:
The unfortunate fate of effectiveness research concerning
the helping professions is increasingly likely as time goes
on as it is a reflection of broad and accelerating tenden-
cies within U.S. society. We should, therefore, look out-
side the helping professions if we wish to ensure their
increasing cost-effectiveness.
*A fact abundantly illustrated, but inadequately researched. That
socialization and the resulting perceptions are helped along by
supporting institutional arrangments may be indicated by the fact
that the UCLA Biomedical Library possesses no copy of Ivan
Illich's famous critique of medicine, Medical Nemesis (New York:
Pantheon, 1976) but two copies of David F.Horrobin's Medical
Hubris: A Reply to Ivan Illich (Montreal: Edan, 1977T
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Let me unpack this notion a little.
Especially in this century there has been the gathering
momentum of large bureaucratic organizations and the conse-
quent incorporation of people into them from early years
until the end of life. As David Riesman argued in The
Lonely Crowd (The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing
American Character, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1950; Abridged Edition, 1965), (although with an
explanation different from mine) this has resulted in a
transformation of human nature in the United States. As
compared to now, a higher proportion of Americans in 1900
were value-oriented: directed by fundamental assumptions
of what was right, good, true, and so forth. Now, a higher
proportion of Americans are situation-oriented: not di-
rected primarily by standards arising independently of the
circumstances of their adult lives.
Students in colleges and universities have spent nearly
their entire lives moving from structured situation to dif-
ferent structured situation within a single general con-
text, in each situation changing to meet the expectations
of those around them. After graduation, they usually con-
tinue to be situation-oriented for the remainder of their
lives. The structures of science, research, and higher
education have likewise shifted from entrepreneurship alone
or in small groups and organizations in the direction of
large organizations. The general drift of social change,
resulting in a concommitant shift in human nature, is also
reflected in science, research, technology, higher educa-
tion, and so forth. This change has also shifted the
incentive system for intellectual and scientific work.
Publication in intellectual and scientific sources is al-
most entirely for advancement in large organizations
(universities included), and not an outgrowth of a search
for truth or understanding. Within the helping profes-
sions, publications has also been for career advancement
rather than for most cost-effective help for those in need.
As publication has gone, so has gone the rest of the lives
of researchers and helpers. One needs only to display pre-
sumed brilliance to those who can affect one's career, one
need not be brilliant at all. (Being brilliant would get
embarassing within organizations which tolerate only
mediocrity.) People who may be described as 'fits' move
up; misfits move out and down or remain where they are.
And value-oriented people are always misfits.
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The history of fundamental discoveries and innovations is
instructive in exhibiting the kinds of person who are like-
ly to make such contributions:
1. Persons with an understanding of reasoning (usually
as it occurs in science);
2. Persons in marginal roles;
3. Persons engaged in some kind of practice; and
4. Value-oriented people
The best single introduction to that history has been provided
by Joseph Ben-David ("Roles and Innovations in Medicine," The
American Journal of Socioloqy, Vol. LXIV, #6, May 1960, pp. 557-
568.)
Considerable marginality. Marginal people tend dispropor-
tionately to develop tuberculosis, schizophrenia, al-
coholism, to become accident victims, to commit suicide, to
die early, to be poor, but, also, marginal people dispro-
portionately are creative, initiators of new ideas and
practices, become eminent men and women of science and
philosophy, and understand (without necessarily prospering
from) the social world which they inhabit.
The rise of people who are situationally oriented has, in
the arenas of intellect and science, resulted in increasing
numbers of "gesture people"--people who intimate enough to
succeed without ever having to accomplish anything worth-
while. Such people produce ideas or knowledge only when
under surveillance--and the surveillance has to be om-
nipresent and searching and competent if they are ever to
amount to much. They move from situation to situation
chamelon-like. Lacking continuity of concern with any
basic problem, they lack the promise of such concern and,
hence, cannot accomplish things which require a long time
perspective and tenacity. Despite the enormous increase in
the number of scientists, researchers, academics, and mem-
bers of related disciplines, professions, and authors of
associated publications, there has emerged what must be
described as pervasive pathological science. (See, for
example, Felix Franks' Polywater, Cambridge, Mass.: The
MIT Press, 1981.)
That the situation in science was not perfect even in Max
Weber's time can be inferred from his Science as a Voca-
tion, addressed to students, in which he wrote: "Do you in
all conscience believe that you can stand seeing mediocrity
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after mediocrity, year after year, climb beyond you, with-
out becoming embittered and without coming to grief?"
(Quoted in Warren 0. Haggstrom, The Scientific Community
N.Y.: Basic Books, 1965). For a contrary contented view
of the state of affairs in science, one might consult "The
Sociology of Science: An Episodic Memoir" by Robert K.
Merton (pp. 3-141 in Merton and Jerry Gaston, Eds., The
Sociology of Science in Europe, Carbondale, Ill.: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1977.) Merton reports a world
which is belied by the relevant data and which I have never
observed, although if one remembers very selectively and
from the perspective of the science establishment one may
be able to write such a utopian memoir. The appearance of
knowledge races on. Knowledge limps far behind. And vir-
tually no one is engaged in trying to distinguish the two.
Intellectual production has come to mean throwing a few
diamonds into a great pile of paste imitations with no
jeweler available subsequently to sort things out. Since
large organizations are usually stable, the perspectives
attached to them also tend to remain stable. Situationally
oriented people may remain in a single organization-related
assumptive world for all their lives. As Felix Franks sug-
gested in a different context, had such an approach been
taken "in the very early days of technical development, we
would now possess the most superior stone axes but little
else." (Ibid., p. 188).
Thus, situation oriented people change from context to context
within stable limits--they lose both the benefit of continuity in
working on a single set of problems and they also lost the bene-
fits of being likely to acquire original ways of seeing.
Those who move up tend to be situation-oriented people who
have disproportionately acquired interpersonal skills, who pro-
claim, but shudder at realizing, such values as creativity, since
realizing them would interfere with their plausibility and safety
in the minds of those above them. And these plausible people
themselves end up as gatekeepers to decisions concerning resource
and incentive allocation. Value-oriented people, typically im-
plausible, are ignored or punished. The fits make good enter-
tainers, may tell interesting anecdotes lifted from others, are
skilled at the character assassination of rivals in such a way
that their tactics don't bounce back on them, and are basically
always conforming and conventional except, maybe, in superficial
symbolic matters.
These situation-oriented successful people scorn such value-
oriented questions as:
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What do you mean by that?
How do you know that?
Why is that important?
What fundamentally new is to be done?
in favor of such questions as:
Where will that get you?
What's in it for me?
What can I get away with?
Why not be successful?
Within the helping professions, value-oriented people are con-
cerned primarily effectively to meet needs; situation-oriented
people are primarily self-concerned. This difference is reflected
in the history of the helping professions as it has developed
since the beginning of this century.
The preponderance of types today (and the view of that in the
minority) may be indicated by Graham Hughes' cynical statement
that: "One cannot throw off moral obligations by entering a pro-
fession," and his observations concerning people whose only talent
is a talent for suffocating talent.
With this brief introduction in mind concerning what I con-
ceive to be the problem, I will now venture some modest specific
recommendations:
1. Develop a marginal discipline for a certain kind of mar-
ginal person: selection, education, and support for value-
oriented people who want to work on some important problem
over long periods of time and who choose to do so in relat-
ing to all available relevant knowledge from all fields,
experiments, and experiences. They would be complete
generalists. They would follow Norbert Wiener's advice:
"If a problem leads us into a new field in which we have no
knowledge, we should acquire such knowledge. It is no ex-
cuse, when working on a problem, to say 'but that's not my
field'." (Reported in J.C. Barker, Scared to Death, Lon-
don: Muller, 1968.)
2. Build on the fact that competent researchers and scientists
increasingly circulate papers before publication. Move to
the next step of not publishing until there is some reason
to suppose that important published work can be separated
out from the rest for the use of people who need to base
their intellectual struggles on actual ideas and/or
knowledge. Help "vanity publications" to emerge in which
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people can pay to get their work in print. (Most publica-
tions would become vanity publications.)
3. Systematically fund efforts to sift out from what has been
published that tiny portion which is important, including
that which can adequately be substantiated by reasons and
evidence. Reward those who originate important work, even
if it remains obscure, controversial, or baffling.
4. Require that university and other teachers label what they
teach as important knowledge or non-knowledge which is
important--and that they be required frequently to defend
their labels.
5. Drastically alter the criteria in accordance with which
research is now evaluated It is rare in the history of
science that any important advance has ben made by way of a
single application of a methodology. The question should
not be one of methodology application in one study, but one
of emerging important knowledge by way of a variety of
studies involving careful thinking and rigorous reasoning
carried out over a long period of time within a research
tradition. Thus, one should pay no attention to whether a
thousand ordinary studies lean in one direction. Ordinary
studies are invalid and unimportant and completely worth-
less except for career promotion. The recruitment of rigor
should be made both within and among research studies--they
are thinking and reasoning chains, they are never merely
additive.
6. Thomas Kuhn, having examined the history of science, has
concluded that the social sciences are not cumulative. It
is similarly doubtful that the helping professions have
made an overall progress for many decades. Even medicine,
the most prestigious of the lot, has, for more than a de-
cade, given rise to comments from its leaders such as that
of Franz J. Ingelburger, Editor Emeritus of the New England
Journal of Medicine:
"If the whole spectrum of medical care is included,
ranging from a pat on the back to transplantation of
the heart, it is doubtful that the benefit-harm ratio
of personalized medical care has changed appreciably
over the last 100 years." (Science, Vol. 200, 16 May,
1978, p. 946.)
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But how can there be progress without first paying atten-
tion to what that is actually known is important and rele-
vant? Concerning most matters, given where we are, we now
have to legitimate the statement "we don't know," and re-
ward those who frequently use it. With the resulting
release from the heavy pseudo-facticity of pseudo-
knowledge, the imagination will be unfettered. As people
become drawn into working on important problems, one can
try to design situations which they can enter and which are
likely to advance their work. I suggest the creation and
institutionalization of carefully designed non-competitive
small discussion groups which meet at least weekly, and in
which all members who honestly try hard to contribute are
carefully respected. Progress, of course, will be messy,
disorderly, will veer back and forth, will leap forward at
some times and lag at others. But the participation of
serious, disciplined value-oriented people in such sur-
roundings will provide the best chance for important prog-
ress to emerge. This suggestion indicates the distance we
have now gone from Kurt Lewin's important early study,
"Group Decision and Social Change," in Theodore M. Newcomb
and Eugene L. Hartley, Eds., Readings in Social Psychology,
New York: Henry Holt, 1947.
7. Select for advanced education value-oriented people charac-
terized by wonder, imagination, tenacity, intellectual
courage, a willingness to look carefully at data which vio-
late his or her assumptions, etc. Do not select on the
basis of grades, scores on the Graduate Record or other
examinations, reference letters which do not describe and
illustrate the above mentioned personal characteristics.
Advanced education, as anyone who has recently examined the
works mentioned in Dissertation Abstracts can attest,
should be reduced to a tiny proportion of the students now
involved in it.
8. The review process in journals, by funding sources, in em-
ploying organizations, now provides little more than
legitimation for fashionable prejudice. Particularly, ini-
tial plausibility unrelated to careful analysis should be
eschewed.
For example, suppose someone were to propose to study and
compare two groups in relation to the intelligence of their
members. One group would be composed of stupied people who
had recently received advanced degrees from Harvard, Yale,
Princeton, Cambridge University and Oxford in England. The
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other group would be composed of brilliant nonliterate peo-
ple from England and the United States. I anticipate that
such a study would initially appear implausible enough not
to be well received by funding sources. Yet, since intel-
ligence and formal education are not associated (although
IQ and formal education are), and since formal education is
associated with training people not to see, I imagine that
sustained attention to the possibility of such research
might well improve its chances.
9. Advertise in the public media (including television and
radio) for deviant young people willing to contribute with
hard work and thinking to the future of the people of our
society without the prospect of getting rich and/or famous.
Help promising residents into appropriate courses of
action.
10. Reduce reliance on measurement and counting as major
sources of decisions.
Abraham Maslow commented: "If the only tool you have is a
hanmmer, you tend to see every problem as a nail."
Operationalization has become a ready source of hammers
which get in the way of adequate perception. Counting and
measuring have been driving out thinking, have distracted
attention from significance, and have disadvantaged mil-
lions of people who have thereby become unfortunately
labelled.
11. The teaching of research in advanced programs should de-
emphasize design and methodology. These are trivia which
anyone can learn at any time. Instead, advanced students
should be taught how to become detectives for the resolu-
tions of lacks of understanding and of fuzzynesses and the
evaluation of their significances. At present, students
get tools (tractor, cultivatorp fertilizer, combine, milk-
ing machine, etc.)--but they are not being taught how to
farm.
12. Effectiveness research should, for the most part, involve
random assignment. Such studies should be supported at far
higher levels than is now done. It is true that helpers
often suppose that randomization is unethical. But con-
sider. The National Association of Social Workers
published a summary of its Code of Ethics which includes
the statement: "The social worker's primary responsibility
is to clients." Similar norms have been proclaimed in the
other helping professions. But, human suffering cannot be
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reduced by helping unless we know its outcome. Research
presently available gives poignancy to Thomas' statement
that: "Suffering is only marginally more tolerable when
inflicted with the best intentions." (The Role of
Medicine: Dream, Mirage, or Nemesis?, London: The Nuf-
field Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1976, p. 158.) Instead
of a few sporadic ad hoc studies, evaluation research
should be systematic, thoughtful, continuously supported,
with knowledge from outcomes fed into the helping
processes.
13. We should examine certain kinds of nonevents with tenacious
care: things of consequence which reasonably could be ex-
pected to happen but didn't.
14. We should take a scientific approach to the evaluation of
these recommendations and assumptions related to them.
Conclusion
The term, 'iatrogenic,' came to be used in medicine by virtue
of the fact that 'iatros' is the Greek word for physician and
Igenesis' means origin. Thus, iatrogenic illness is taken to be
physician-originated illness. (This usage has been expanded some-
what in recent years.)
In this note, we have been concerned with helper-originated
harm. Since the modern Greek transliteration of 'helper' is
'voethos', I suggest that we refer to helper-originated harm as
voethogenic harm (of which iatrogenic disease is one variety).
The notion of voethogenic harm has not here been spelled out,
although it has been illustrated. In particular, the above exam-
ples lead to an emphasis of sins of commission, not those of
omission--even though the latter should make up a substantial part
of the whole. We will elsewhere explicate the range of applcia-
tions of this term.*
*This note has incorporated some reflections accompanying my study
of the thinking involved in helping.
This note, of course, is very preliminary, and will be extensively
revised at a later time, after my work has further progressed.
The last few pages are especially problematic. The note only re-
flects where I happened to be on one afternoon of August, 1981.
For contributinq to my research, I wish to express my appreciaton
to my wife, Raquel, who has taught me so much, and to my daughter,
Marni, who has been my sole relentless critic.
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